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Abstract: Testing and accountability measures have continued to expand since the passage of the 
No Child Left Behind Act in 2001. In addition to school and district accountability, student test 
scores increasingly formed the foundation of teacher performance metrics. State participation rates 
exceeded the 95% minimum prescribed by law despite increasing opposition to many testing 
requirements. However, the rollout of the Common Core aligned PARCC tests in 2015 marked the 
start of a backlash against state mandated testing. The movement, commonly called opt-out, 
encouraged families not to participate in required tests. We use pooled OLS regression on statewide 
panel data from Colorado schools to examine school-level characteristics in one of the states with 
the largest declines in test participation. We find the prevalence of opt-out is largest in charter 
schools, suburban and rural areas, higher performing schools, and schools with a higher proportion 
of White students.  
Keywords: Accountability; education reform; politics of education 
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Características del movimiento de “opt-out”: Evidencia temprana para Colorado  
Resumen: Las medidas de evaluación y rendición de cuentas han continuado expandiéndose desde 
la aprobación del Acta de No Child Left Behind en 2001. Además de la responsabilidad de la escuela 
y el distrito, los puntajes de las pruebas de los estudiantes formaron cada vez más la base de las 
métricas de rendimiento de los maestros. Las tasas de participación del estado superaron el mínimo 
del 95% prescrito por la ley a pesar de la creciente oposición a muchos requisitos de prueba. Sin 
embargo, el lanzamiento de las pruebas PARCC alineadas con Common Core en 2015 marcó el 
inicio de una reacción violenta contra las pruebas exigidas por el estado. El movimiento, 
comúnmente llamado de exclusión, alentó a las familias a no participar en las pruebas requeridas. 
Usamos la regresión OLS agrupada en los datos del panel estatal de las escuelas de Colorado para 
examinar las características a nivel escolar en uno de los estados con los mayores descensos en la 
participación en las pruebas. Encontramos que la prevalencia de la exclusión voluntaria es mayor en 
las escuelas charter, áreas suburbanas y rurales, escuelas con mayor rendimiento y escuelas con una 
mayor proporción de estudiantes blancos. 
Palabras clave: Rendición de cuentas; Reforma educativa; política de la educación 
 
Características do movimento de “opt-out”: Evidencia temprana para Colorado 
Resumo: As medidas de teste e rendição de contas continuaram a se expandir desde a aprovação da 
Lei de No Child Left Behind, de 2001. Além da responsabilidade escolar e distrital, os resultados dos 
testes dos alunos formaram cada vez mais a base das métricas de desempenho dos professores. As 
taxas de participação do Estado excederam o mínimo de 95% prescrito pela lei, apesar da crescente 
oposição a muitos requisitos de teste. No entanto, a implementação dos testes PARCC alinhados ao 
Common Core em 2015 marcou o início de uma reação contra os testes obrigatórios do Estado. O 
movimento, comumente chamado de opt-out, encorajou as famílias a não participarem dos testes 
exigidos. Usamos a regressão OLS agrupada em dados de painel estaduais de escolas do Colorado 
para examinar as características do nível escolar em um dos estados com os maiores declínios na 
participação em testes. A prevalência de opt-out é maior em escolas charter, suburbanas e rurais, 
escolas de melhor desempenho e escolas com maior proporção de estudantes brancos. 
Palavras-chave: Rendição de contas; reforma educacional; política de educação 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For better or worse, standardized testing is one of the foundations of the modern 
accountability-driven educational system in the United States. Countless policies across the nation 
hold schools, and increasingly, teachers, accountable for student performance on such exams. 
Standardized test results are widely reported in the media and are seen by parents and policymakers 
as a reflection of school quality.  
 A major assumption underlying the use of standardized tests is that the group of students 
taking the exams represents the student body within the school or school system. It is for that 
reason that the No Child Left Behind Act required 95% participation rates on mandated tests. 
Typically, schools have achieved and exceeded this threshold (CDE, 2015; Chingos, 2015). Recently, 
however, a movement in which students do not take the exams has cropped up in some areas of the 
country. Starting in 2015, a number of locations began to experience significant levels of non-
participation – an event that coincided with the implementation of the Common Core aligned 
PARCC tests for states such as Colorado. Typically known as “opting-out,” this non-participation 
has been relatively unexamined in terms of the types of students and schools directly involved. 
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Nationally, opt-out rates have varied dramatically with California experiencing a relatively modest 
3%, while New York and Colorado had 10% and 20% rates, respectively, in English Language Arts 
(Bennett, 2016). To date, few studies examine the student level characteristics of schools where 
participation in opt-out was prevalent. 
Colorado represents an excellent context for a detailed investigation of the opt-out 
phenomenon. First, the state experienced a dramatic increase in opt-out rates after the start of the 
Common Core aligned tests. Between the 2011 and 2014 school years, no district in the state fell 
below the required 95% participation rate. In 2015, however, participation rates in six districts fell to 
as low as 60% participation, depending on the grade level and test (CDE, 2015; Gorski, 2015b). 
Second, the state simultaneously adopted a new teacher accountability system utilizing student-level 
test data for high-stakes employment decisions. Finally, Colorado continues to be a national leader 
in opting-out, calling into question accountability requirements that utilize test scores for teachers, 
schools, and federal measures.  
Characteristics that predict changes in the rate of opt-out are informative to policy 
considerations in a number of ways. If opt-out is evenly or randomly distributed across schools, then 
there is little cause for concern about the quality of inferences on state-level assessments or teacher 
evaluation metrics. If, however, there are systematic differences between those who opt-out and 
those who participate, then those inferences become suspect. For example, highly-involved parents 
and/or parents with high levels of cultural capital – class-based resources that can be used to garner 
social profits (Bourdieu, 1986) – and knowledge about schooling could withdraw their students from 
what they see as extraneous or excessive state-level assessments. This is consistent with research 
suggesting that privileged students and their parents – those with higher levels of cultural capital – 
are more likely to ask for exceptions (Lareau & Calarco, 2012). Other parents, with less knowledge 
about the mechanics of testing or those who defer to their children’s educators, may be less likely to 
withdraw their students from testing. Because cultural capital has been shown by some to be 
associated with educational outcomes (e.g. DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985), these scenarios could skew 
school-level results. Further, should opt-out be significantly more likely in lower performing schools, 
state and federal education policy makers should view these changes with the same suspicion as 
widespread test cheating schemes. Finally, systematic differences across racial/ethnic lines should 
raise questions regarding active or passive discrimination on the part of teachers or school leaders.  
 To explore opt-out, we examined changes in grade-level participation rates on state-
mandated ELA tests in grades 3-9 in Colorado after the spread of the opt-out movement in 2015. 
The primary objective of this study is to explore whether particular school characteristics are 
associated with a decline in test participation. Specifically, our research question asks: Are there 
school-level characteristics that predict opt-out behavior in state mandated exams? We found that 
the percentage of opt-out is largest in suburban and rural areas, higher performing public schools, 
and schools with a higher proportion of White students. 
 
Background 
  
 High-stakes testing and widespread federal incentives to states regarding accountability 
measures can largely be traced to the second Bush administration’s reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). NCLB 
was clearly the largest expansion of ESEA and, for the first time, included required annual 
assessments for all students. Schools and districts from every state were now accountable to federal 
student performance mandates that aligned assessments to state content standards. Annual 
assessments in ELA were required for all students in grades 3-8 and once during high school 
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(Egalite, Fusarelli, & Fusarelli, 2017; McGuinn, 2016). In an attempt to guarantee educational equity, 
states were required to report the level of student proficiency as measured by adequate yearly 
progress (AYP) for all relevant student subgroups, including gender, race/ethnicity, poverty, 
disability, and English language status (Haertel & Herman, 2005). The Obama administration’s Race 
to the Top program further incentivized federal priorities including adoption of the Common Core 
and linking student test performance to teacher accountability (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009). 
In late 2015, the Obama administration passed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), the 
ninth major reauthorization of ESEA. Addressing concerns from states, districts, and schools, the 
act removed the AYP measure; however, the focus on rigorous content standards and the use of 
annual assessments established in NCLB remained unchanged. The new law returned a number of 
accountability decisions to the state and local level and provided greater flexibility with performance 
level indicators and school improvement interventions. The reauthorization also maintained a focus 
on the idea of educational equity through assessment, requiring the reporting of student subgroup 
performance on two new student subgroups: gender and migrant status (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2015). While there were some noticeable differences between ESSA and NCLB, 
using assessments to attempt to improve student achievement in underperforming schools remained 
a fundamental focus of federal education policy (Egalite et al., 2017; McGuinn, 2016). 
Central to the increase in accountability measures was a high participation rate in state 
mandated testing. NCLB required, and ESSA retained, the threshold of 95% participation in large 
part to ensure valid inferences about the results for both the school as a whole and reported 
subgroups (Spellings, 2007). The failure to achieve high participation rates has been shown to 
negatively affect the ability of policymakers to achieve valid interpretations and correctly identify low 
performing schools (Baker & Linn, 2002; Betebenner & Linn, 2010). The issue of the diminished 
participation and the degree to which scores reflected the total population was further exacerbated 
when student-level test performance was used as part of the measure of teacher efficacy in systems 
such as Colorado’s.  
 
The Opt-Out Movement 
 
Overall, limited research exists on the opt-out movement. Existing studies present a 
complex narrative. For example, a New York study using district-level data found a positive 
relationship between wealth/test scores and opting-out (Chingos, 2015). After controlling for 
free/reduced lunch, however, the relationship changed direction, showing that districts with lower 
scores had higher levels of opting-out (Chingos, 2015). There are other accounts, from the popular 
media and other sources, that suggest that most opt-outs are representative of a limited number of 
highly involved, affluent families in a limited number of schools (Gorski, 2015b; Robertson, 2015). 
This is supported by some existing research. A non-representative, online national survey, for 
example, found that activists in the opt-out movement tend to be “highly educated, white, married, 
politically liberal parent(s) whose children attend public school and whose household median 
income is well above the national average” (Pizmony-Levy & Saraisky, 2016, p. 6). Opt-out 
participants were well informed and represented groups that frequently test well – only a fraction of 
the respondents expressed concern about test performance or school quality as a reason for opting-
out. Indeed, in Pizmony-Levy and Saraisky’s (2016) study, many opt-out participants indicated that 
their primary reason for opting-out was opposition to the use of tests to evaluate teachers. Others 
were concerned about how testing promotes rote memorization over critical thinking, and about 
growing privatization and the role of corporations in schools. In short, this research, and the 
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accompanying media accounts, suggest that parents with knowledge about schooling and 
educational systems and the perceived power to question those systems – in other words, parents 
with high levels of cultural capital – are more empowered to opt-out. Still, some states – like New 
York and Colorado – have experienced relatively high rates of opt-out, suggesting the phenomenon 
may be more widespread and complex than a limited group of suburban districts. 
 Other related research suggests that for schools facing federal and state sanctions, such as 
school closure or change to charter status, opting-out could present an opportunity to artificially 
increase test scores in ways similar to cheating (Amrein-Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau, 2010; Jacob & 
Levitt, 2002). For example, Amrein-Beardsley, Berliner, & Rideau (2010), found that a significant 
number of surveyed teachers had at least heard of another teacher helping students in some way on 
state-mandated tests. Relating this to the practice of opting-out, one teacher in Amrein-Beardsley 
and colleagues’ study reported that she/he encouraged a student to opt-out, stating: 
The student did not speak the language so it was very unfair to take a test that one 
could not read. So I said stay home in the morning and come after lunch. I allowed 
the student to do the math section because he could do the problems. (p. 15)  
 
Though there has been little research as to how widespread this issue is, and we could only find one 
example of this in a published study, this conduct warrants attention. While cheating artificially raises 
scores of select students, opting-out removes potentially lower scoring students from the testing 
pool entirely. Teachers and school leaders could be actively or passively encouraging students to test 
based on their perceived ability to meet achievement standards (Figlio, 2006; Freeman, 2015), which 
could mean discrimination along racial/ethnic lines and/or socioeconomic status. In this way, 
selectively encouraging a few students to opt-out could achieve similar aims as more complicated 
cheating programs. Indeed, researchers using Ohio data demonstrated that school rankings could be 
swayed by a change in the participation of as few as 11 students in a single school (Beaver, 
Westmaas, & Sludden, 2015). If this motivation is a primary reason for opting-out, we should expect 
schools with lower accountability ratings to experience higher levels of opting-out. 
There is also the possibility that opting-out could reflect regional differences in the perceived 
utility of school accountability systems. Rural, urban, and suburban schools differ on many of the 
metrics that reflect geographic differences. This includes wide disparities in base funding, passing 
rates for bond initiatives, and different rates of attendance to higher education (Bowers, Metzger, & 
Militello, 2010; Byun, Meece, & Irvin, 2012; Gebert, Calkin, & Schuster, 2004; Reyes & Rodriguez, 
2004). It should not be surprising that they respond to accountability measures uniquely based on 
the local context. This could extend to opt-out, though there has been no research to date that 
parses out these differences. 
Finally, opting-out could be reflective of a broader, more complex social movement. 
According to Pizmony-Levy and Saraisky (2016), parents engaging in opting-out are taking part in 
collective action to “pursue their objectives mainly through non-institutional means of disruption of 
accustomed practices (e.g. standardized tests)” (p. 10). If a broader social movement is the 
motivation for opting-out, then timing of opt-out would be expected to coincide with a critical event 
such as the implementation of the Common Core aligned PARCC tests or new statewide 
accountability measures for teachers (Klandermans, 1984). As a result, we would expect wider 
variation across types of students and schools engaging in opting-out, as the motivations are not well 
captured through school-level covariates. 
In short, the research on opting-out is scant. Existing studies indicate that White, affluent, 
educated parents may be at the forefront of the opt-out movement, in opposition to high levels of 
testing, and the use of high stakes testing for teacher evaluation (Pizmony-Levy & Saraisky, 2016). 
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There is also the potential that lower-performing students could be encouraged to opt-out in order 
to raise mandated test scores. The gaps in the literature leave many questions to be answered: does 
opt-out vary across racial/ethnic lines? By socioeconomic status? By school-type? Turnaround 
status? Opt-out could be happening at different levels for specific sub-groups and school contexts. 
 
Framing the Opt-Out Movement: Cultural Capital 
The research outlined above suggests that the opt-out movement could be a reaction by 
families with the knowledge and perceived power to opt-out of testing without fear of repercussions. 
Research also indicates that opt-out may be a form of protest, with parents using opt-out to object 
to increased testing requirements, privatization, and how the tests are used, among other concerns 
(Pizmony-Levy & Saraisky, 2016). The idea of parents choosing to opt-out to help their children, or 
to protest testing and accountability could be seen as a manifestation of parents’ cultural capital. In 
this paper, we link cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986) to this idea of increased parent knowledge 
about schooling and empowerment to question school practices, and use cultural capital as an 
explanatory framework for our findings. 
According to Bourdieu (1973), cultural capital is the internalization of culture and traditions, 
usually passed on by the family. Cultural capital is acquired over time and is present in knowledge 
about school, appropriate attitudes and beliefs, personal style, and linguistic competence sanctified 
by the dominant culture (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). It is class-based, with the more privileged classes 
able to use their internalized resources and knowledge in exchange for benefits (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Cultural capital is also institutionalized as credentials and qualifications that can be used for 
influence and economic gain. In the education system, cultural capital (or perceived lack of cultural 
capital) is how social inequality and class structure are perpetuated.  
In education, cultural capital also manifests in how parents interact with schools and 
educators – often, parents with high levels of cultural capital feel empowered to ask for exceptions, 
and they use their knowledge and resources to provide their children with educational advantages 
(Lareau & Calarco, 2012). Privileged parents also pass on internalized knowledge about appropriate 
school behavior to their children. Those students who know how to act in school – according to 
primarily White, middle-class norms – are better able to operate within that system. Scholars 
applying theories of cultural capital have also found that middle- and upper-class parents pass on 
notions of social class that provide advantages and encourage entitlement (Lareau, 2002). Indeed, 
students’ advantages and the entitlement propagated by parents’ levels of cultural capital may 
ultimately influence student performance – some research has also shown that cultural capital is 
related to student outcomes (DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985). 
In relation to opting-out, cultural capital may manifest in two ways: parents’ decision to opt-
out in order to provide advantages to their children (e.g. to avoid “testing fatigue”), or the decision 
to opt-out in order to protest the very concept of testing (e.g. to object to using tests to evaluate 
teachers). In both scenarios, parents with higher degrees of cultural capital may have the knowledge 
and access to information about opting-out and feel sufficiently empowered to remove their 
children from required testing because they do not fear the repercussions of doing so. Parents with 
more cultural capital use their resources to gain advantages for their students in their interactions 
with teachers and schools (Lareau, 2011). It stands to reason then that if parents feel that their 
students are not gaining anything from high stakes testing requirements, or if they feel that the 
increased levels of testing are actively taking something away from their children, parents with high 
levels of cultural capital may try to assist their children by opting-out. Further, their experience with 
federal accountability measures reflects an increase in test preparation and narrowing of the 
curriculum to more accurately align with state and national standards such as the Common Core. 
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Thus, they may want to opt their students out of testing to protest the idea of “teaching to the test.” 
These parents’ social class and cultural capital may also allow them to feel entitled to opt-out to 
protest increased testing requirements, using tests to evaluate teachers, or the increased level of 
privatization in schools. Cultural capital thus provides an explanatory framework within which to 
situate our findings on opt-out. 
 
Colorado Context 
 
We focus specifically on Colorado in our exploration of the opt-out movement. We do so 
because Colorado presents an important case study of the type of schools and communities that 
have thus far been affected by the opt-out movement in some way. The state is geographically and 
politically diverse with a strong history of local control in education. It was one of three states, along 
with New York and Rhode Island, to experience large scale opt-out on state testing in 2015 
(Bennett, 2016). Colorado fits squarely within a national movement wherein a majority of Americans 
were aware of opt-out as it related to standardized tests and the Common Core, specifically 
(Pizmony-Levy & Cosman, 2017). 
The implementation of the new PARCC tests in 2015 marked a change in the incremental 
increase in statewide testing and accountability measures. This change was characterized by an 
alignment to the Common Core and by an increased number of testing days. Moreover, this 
occurred against the backdrop of the baseline year of the new – and hotly contested – teacher 
accountability system, which required using student growth measures for 50% of the teachers’ total 
score (CDE, 2015; Johnston, 2014). This perceived structural shift in the education landscape 
prompted increased criticism from a number of stakeholders, including parents and school leaders. 
Criticism was widespread both nationally (Bennet, 2016; Fairbanks, 2015; Taylor & Rich, 2015) and 
locally (Gorksi, 2015a, 2015b); community leaders from local and national groups such as United to 
Counter the Core and United Opt Out encouraged parents to opt-out of testing (Gorksi, 2015b; 
Robertson, 2015).  
Policymakers in Colorado did attempt to respond to an apparent groundswell against the 
new tests. In January 2015, the Colorado State Board of Education (SBE) voted to allow local 
districts to opt-out of portions of state mandated testing – including the new PARCC assessments. 
This action subsequently called into question if the SBE had the statutory authority to release 
districts from testing and culminated in the State Attorney General issuing an opinion stating the 
SBE did not have the legal authority to grant such waivers (State of Colorado, 2015). Further 
complicating matters, the Commissioner of the Colorado Department of Education (CDE) issued a 
statement in February 2015 that districts would not be penalized for having participation rates fall 
below the required 95% (CDE, 2015), although it was silent on the impact on school performance 
rankings. The United States Department of Education, however, later rejected Colorado’s request 
and stated districts would not be exempt from participation requirements (Deslile, 2015).  
 Colorado’s statewide school performance framework (SPF) places an emphasis on five key 
performance indicators: academic growth, academic achievement, academic growth gaps, 
postsecondary workforce readiness, and participation. Each performance indicator is rated to form 
an overall school performance ranking in order of overall achievement: performance, improvement, 
priority improvement, and turnaround. Schools placed on turnaround status must submit annual 
plans to the state and face additional monitoring requirements for a period of three years. 
Turnaround schools that fail to meet performance indicators are required to move to at least priority 
improvement and may be closed or reconstituted as charters (CDE, 2015). By the spring of 2016, 
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the bottom two categories, turnaround and priority improvement, equaled approximately 9% of 
schools in the state.  
As they entered the 2015 testing window, schools had limited information as to the exact 
requirements for participation and specifically how the state would take opt-out into account in the 
school performance frameworks. For those schools in the turnaround and priority improvement 
categories, systematic non-participation held the simultaneous possibility of changing achievement 
rankings—up or down depending on which students failed to participate—and possible sanctions 
for failing to meet the 95% participation threshold. 
Though declining participation rates in some Colorado schools is well known, prior to this 
study, we have little detailed information about the characteristics of the schools where the opt-out 
phenomenon is most prevalent. Is the decline in participation widespread across the state, or is it 
centralized in a few particular schools that receive attention? Have participation rates dropped 
similarly in urban, rural, and suburban settings? Is opt-out most prevalent in low- or high-
performing schools? The purpose of this study is to address such questions and more clearly 
document the relationship between observed characteristics and declines in test participation. In so 
doing, we aim to examine the overall pattern of relationships between school characteristics and test 
participation rates. Formally we ask: Are there school-level characteristics that predict opt-out 
behavior in state mandated exams? 
 
Sample and Methods 
  
We examined the participation rate of public traditional and charter schools in Colorado 
schools for state mandated testing for English language arts (ELA) from the 2012 testing cycle 
through 2016. This was accomplished by assembling a number of publicly available datasets 
provided by CDE and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) into a single panel. 
From CDE, we obtained school performance framework (SPF) scores, enrollment characteristics, 
test participation in ELA and math, and school level characteristics. We merged these data with 
NCES urbanicity classification collapsed to the levels of urban, suburban, and rural.  
This panel resulted in all public schools in Colorado. We then restricted our sample to 
traditional public schools and charter schools—excluding sites dedicated to special education, 
vocational, online, alternative education, or closed within the 2012-2016 period— leaving a final 
sample of 96% of public schools in Colorado. This yielded 1,049 elementary, 545 middle, and 390 
high schools. Descriptive data is presented in table 1. CDE suspended calculations of SPF during 
the transition to PARCC testing in 2015 and did not release new rankings until spring 2017. This 
meant all schools retained their 2014 ranking during the entire opt-out period. Schools may have, 
however, responded to suspending the SPF differently based on their baseline ranking.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
  3rd 4th  5th  6th 7th 8th 9th 
Urbanicity 
Rural 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.51 0.57 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Suburban 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.28 0.24 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) 
Urban 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.18 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) 
        
Race/Ethnicity 
Native American 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
Asian 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hispanic 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
African-American 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.36 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mutli-Racial 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
White 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
        
  School Performance Framework Category 
Turnaround 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) 
Priority Improvement 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.20) 
Improvement 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.16 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Performance 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.70 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.45) 
 
School Type 
Charter 
0.13 
(.33) 
0.13 
(.33) 
0.13 
(.33) 
0.22 
(.41) 
0.25 
(.43) 
0.25 
(.43) 
0.16 
(.37) 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.41) (0.43) (0.43) (0.37) 
        
Total Number of Schools 1049 1049 1042 675 545 544 390 
Mean (SD) 
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In this study, we present results on the tested grades 3-9 in ELA. Although not reported 
here, results are similar when we look at the math exams. Our primary analysis was a pooled OLS 
regression model to measure the relationship between observed school characteristics and 
participation rates on state mandated tests in ELA. Formally, we used OLS to estimate: 
 
Participation rateit= β0+ β2X +β3 (X * opt-out years) + β4 opt out years+ε                                    (1) 
 
 
where Participation rate is the percentage participation in ELA in year t for grade i; X is a vector of 
school characteristics including school racial and ethnic composition with White as the reference; 
charter; urbanicity with urban as the reference group; SPF with Performance as the reference; and 
percentage  free/reduced lunch (FRL); opt-out years indicates the year is 2015 or later; ε is a robust 
term clustered at the school level; and β’s are parameters to be estimated. Our primary interest was 
the interaction between selected observed characteristics and the opt-out years indicator although we 
present results for baseline years for comparison and descriptive purposes. 
 To examine various motivations for opting-out, we present a series of variations on Model 
(1). The first, presented in Table 3, is a pooled OLS of the baseline years 2012-2014. Next, we 
present a series of models interacted on a different set of covariates theorized to motivate opting out 
with the opt-out period. These interactions include urbanicity (Table 4), race/ethnicity (Table 5), 
SPF (Table 6), charter and proportion of FRL students (Table 7). All models met the assumptions 
for OLS including linearity, multivariate normality, and homoscedasticity. To further prevent issues 
with homoscedasticity, we used the robust standard errors command in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2014). 
To explore concerns of multicollinearity, we conducted a variance inflation factor (VIF) tests for 
each model utilizing a VIF cutpoint of 10 to identify issues of multicollinearity (Mertler & Vannatta, 
2013). 
 
Results 
 
We first set out to describe the basic patterns of participation rates during the time periods 
under consideration. Consistent with expectations from media reports, there was a substantial 
decline in the participation rates on Colorado’s state standardized tests in the 2015 school year with 
a rebound in 2016 that did not, however, return to previous levels.  
We present basic descriptive characteristics of the sample for ELA in Table 2. The table 
shows that while there was a decline in participation in all grade levels, the drop was sharpest in the 
middle and high school grades. In the ninth grade, participation dropped from 98% in 2014 to 75% 
in 2015. The remainder of the table illustrates differences in the changes of participation rates by 
SPF and urbanicity. The aggregate decline in participation, not controlling for any other factors, was 
similar across school performance ratings. However, it does appear that the decline in overall 
participation in 2015 was larger in rural schools than in the urban or suburban schools, although this 
gap closed the following year. 
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Table 2 
Statewide Assessment Participation Rates in ELA By Grade 
 Baseline Years Opt-out Years 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
3rd 
99.59 
(1.33) 
99.54 
(1.51) 
99.60 
(1.57) 
94.95 
(8.78) 
96.10 
(6.33) 
4th  
99.67 
(0.90) 
99.66 
(1.14) 
99.60 
(1.09) 
94.68 
(9.72) 
95.64 
(7.04) 
5th 
99.34 
(4.71) 
99.54 
(3.42) 
99.57 
(1.31) 94.36 (10.16) 
95.02 
(7.87) 
6th 
99.53 
(1.11) 
99.30 
(5.49) 
99.46 
(1.08) 92.31 (12.39) 
92.99 
(10.30) 
7th 
99.59 
(0.90) 
99.40 
(2.02) 
99.51 
(0.93) 89.26 (14.90) 
91.11 
(12.40) 
8th 
99.15 
(3.04) 
99.04 
(4.77) 
99.25 
(2.28) 86.74 (17.17) 
88.00 
(14.66) 
9th  
99.33 
(4.18) 
98.09 
(4.50) 
98.18 
(5.0) 74.71 (24.16) 
81.29 
(20.31) 
 School Performance Rating 
Performance 
99.23 
(2.47) 
99.15 
(3.98) 
99.31 
(1.53) 91.49 (14.37) 
95.24 
(8.02) 
Improvement 
99.23 
(2.47) 
99.15 
(3.98) 
99.32 
(1.53) 91.48 (14.37) 
95.25 
(8.03) 
Priority Improvement 
98.96 
(4.23) 
99.31 
(1.60) 
99.14 
(3.13) 91.99 (15.36) 
97.49 
(4.15) 
Turnaround 
99.18 
(2.75) 
97.38 
(11.57) 
98.06 
(6.59) 91.70 (12.35) 
96.19 
(6.07) 
 Urbanicity 
Urban 
99.41 
(1.57) 
99.24 
(4.32) 
99.36 
(1.20) 91.36 (14.67) 
95.11 
(8.86) 
Rural 
99.38 
(3.16) 
99.42 
(3.05) 
99.49 
(1.67) 85.26 (21.82) 
92.27 
(11.44) 
Suburban 
99.29 
(3.12) 
99.32 
(3.12) 
99.27 
(2.31) 89.67 (17.53) 
92.70 
(11.97) 
Note: Mean participation rate (Standard Deviation) 
 
We descriptively illustrate the relationship between SPF and participation rate in Figure 1. 
The figure shows testing participation rates for ELA in grades 5, 7, and 9 in 2016 for schools of 
increasing school quality as measured under the accountability system without any statistical 
controls. The horizontal axis is the percentage of possible points on the SPF, which is the metric 
used to assign the categorical rating, and each symbol is a unique school/grade combination. The 
downward slope of the fitted lines shows the negative relationship between higher performing 
schools and the participation rate for each grade. Also apparent in the figure is the exceptionally 
high rate of opt-out for ninth graders — with many schools falling below 60%—and the degree of 
slope on the fit line relative two the other grades.  
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Figure 1. Percentage participation in ELA for grades 5, 7, and 9 in ELA 2016 by overall SPF points 
earned.   
 
Baseline Characteristics 
We now turn to a basic regression model meant to describe the overall pattern of 
relationships between school characteristics and test participation rates accounting for other 
observed characteristics of the school. We first consider the relationship between school 
characteristics and participation rates prior to the advent of the opt-out movement.  
Table 3 reports the results from the pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variable is 
the participation rate for the school on the ELA exam and the independent variables include the full 
vector of school characteristics in Model 1. In order to assess the relationships between these 
variables and participation rates at the baseline, the regression in Table 3 includes only observations 
from years 2012, 2013, and 2014.  
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Table 3 
Regression results for ELA for Baseline Years  
 ELA 
                
 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
        
 Urbanicity 
Rural 0.075 0.250* -1.630 1.429 0.045 0.305 0.033 
 (-0.149) (0.148) (1.062) (1.347) (0.164) (0.211) (0.529) 
Suburban 0.061 0.293** -0.930 1.634 -0.076 -0.297 -0.643 
 (-0.135) (0.132) (0.700) (1.750) (0.149) (0.211) (0.557) 
        
 Race/Ethnicity 
        
Native American 0.000 0.001 -0.018 0.053 -0.052 -0.252** -0.551** 
 (-0.025) (0.014) (0.046) (0.094) (0.052) (0.110) (0.257) 
Asian -0.012 -0.002 -0.005 0.082* 0.031*** 0.054** 0.009 
 (-0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.047) (0.010) (0.027) (0.065) 
Hispanic 0.003 0.004 -0.017 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.008 
 (-0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.027) 
African American -0.022* 0.006 -0.010 -0.049 -0.005 -0.002 -0.012 
 (-0.012) (0.005) (0.032) (0.050) (0.007) (0.013) (0.034) 
Multi-Racial 0.014 -0.011 -0.030 -0.001 0.002 -0.061 -0.123 
 (-0.021) (0.015) (0.058) (0.061) (0.023) (0.073) (0.173) 
        
 School Performance Rating 
Turnaround -0.407 -0.281 -1.240 -0.537 -0.719 -1.732 -7.880 
 (-0.558) (0.236) (1.801) (0.520) (0.461) (1.070) (4.862) 
Priority 
Improvement 0.053 -0.267** 0.352 -0.150 -0.211 -1.421* -2.488* 
 (-0.105) (0.123) (0.289) (0.436) (0.140) (0.770) (1.279) 
Improvement -0.020 -0.152** 0.070 -0.415 -0.105 -0.459** -1.579** 
 (-0.107) (0.066) (0.151) (0.576) (0.088) (0.217) (0.664) 
        
Charter -0.041 0.034 0.067 -0.310 0.075 0.530*** 1.699** 
 (0.144) (0.061) (0.156) (0.258) (0.079) (0.188) (0.714) 
% FRL -0.004 -0.005* 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.023 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.020) 
        
Observations 2,780 2,786 2,768 1,675 1,321 1,277 912 
R-squared 0.071 0.104 0.081 0.056 0.230 0.161 0.265 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
The upper panel of Table 3 compares participation rates prior to the start of the opt-out 
movement. Suburban and rural schools participated at slightly different rates than did the reference 
group urban, although the differences were rarely statistically or practically significant with 
differences in participation ranging from .033% in the ninth grade to -1.63% in the fifth grade. In 
baseline years, urbanicity was a significant predictor in the fourth grade with rural and urban schools 
participating at approximately 0.25% higher rates that suburban schools.  
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The second panel of Table 3 compares the relative proportion of school populations with 
White as the reference group. In baseline years, Race/ethnicity was not a strong predictor of 
participation in elementary grades. In the eighth and ninth grades, schools with higher proportions 
of Native American students participating at lower rates of -0.252 and -0.551 respectively. Schools 
with higher proportions of Asian had slightly higher participation rates of 0.082 in the sixth and 
0.031 in the seventh.  
The third panel of Table 3 compares baseline characteristics by school quality as measured 
by the state’s School Performance Framework (SPF). Prior to opt-out, lower SPF ratings frequently 
corresponded to decreased participation. Schools at the lowest ranking—turnaround—had some of 
the largest differences in participation relative to the top ranking comparison group—performance. 
The results were not statistically significant for turnaround schools although by the ninth grade the 
difference was a practically significant 7.88% lower participation. Similarly, priority improvement 
and improvement category schools showed increasingly larger differences in participation in later 
grades with significant differences in the eighth and ninth grades with priority improvement schools 
have 2.488% lower participation levels.  
Finally, charter status reflected greater variation by grade with 0.034% higher participation in 
the fourth grade and 1.699% higher in the ninth although results were only significant in the eighth 
and ninth grades. Increases in the proportion of FRL were rarely a significant predictor of test 
participation prior to the opt-out movement. 
Opt-out Years 
Next, we present the primary regression models that look at the differences in the 
relationship between the observed characteristics and participation rates before and after the opt-out 
phenomenon. Each table reports the estimates of interest from regression models by grade level that 
include interactions of particular categories. For space considerations, the table reports only results 
from the coefficients for the main effect and the interaction between the identified school 
characteristic and the opt-out period. Again, these are not fully interacted models. The models differ 
by the variables that are interacted with the 2015 and 2016 time periods when the opt-out 
movement appears to have begun. 
Table 4 reports the interaction results for urbanicity with the results relative to the control 
group, urban schools. Compared to urban schools, rural and suburban schools participated at higher 
rates prior to the start of opt-out. When interacted with the opt-out period, however, the results 
change. The rate of participation for rural schools consistently and significantly decreased relative to 
urban schools during the opt-out period. The interaction of rural* opt-out shows the change in 
participation rates ranged from -1.491% in the third grade to a high of -4.602% in the seventh grade. 
A similar picture emerges for suburban schools starting in the fourth grade. Participation rates 
consistently decreased in suburban school from the sixth through ninth grades with ninth graders 
experiencing an 8% decline relative to their urban peers. This finding is consistent with the common 
perception that largely parents and students outside of the cities drive the opt-out phenomenon. 
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Table 4 
Regression results for Urbanicity 
VARIABLES 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Rural 0.715*** 0.890*** 0.704* 1.184*** 2.035*** 2.943*** 1.959* 
VIF 3.97 (0.180) (0.199) (0.404) (0.340) (0.452) (0.592) (1.167) 
Suburban 0.457*** 0.640*** 0.566* 0.892*** 1.563*** 2.000*** 2.275** 
VIF 3.48 (0.138) (0.136) (0.302) (0.272) (0.309) (0.451) (1.008) 
Rural* Opt Out -1.491*** -2.380*** -2.342*** -4.037*** -4.602*** -4.472*** -3.583* 
VIF 3.48 (0.451) (0.482) (0.554) (0.817) (0.962) (1.181) (2.023) 
Suburban* Opt Out 0.155 -0.859** -0.766 -2.185*** -3.467*** -4.177*** -8.151*** 
VIF 3.68 (0.385) (0.406) (0.480) (0.755) (0.973) (1.295) (2.310) 
Opt Out -4.148*** -3.882*** -4.180*** -5.024*** -7.293*** -9.691*** -19.18*** 
 -0.319 (0.330) (0.397) (0.617) (0.706) (0.955) (1.768) 
Observations 4,707 4,702 4,671 2,846 2,246 2,191 1,556 
R-squared 0.171 0.183 0.161 0.203 0.274 0.310 0.403 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses Reference Group (Urban) 
  
Table 5 follows the same pattern, presenting the main effects of racial/ethnic composition 
of schools, opt-out and their interaction. The key outcome of interest is the interaction term 
showing the change in the effect of race/ethnicity during the opt-out time period. Before opt-out 
began there were few significant or practical differences based on race/ethnicity relative to the 
comparison group, White students. After opt-out began, increases in the percentage of Native 
American students consistently corresponded with a decline in participation rates although results 
were only significant in high school with a -1.182% change. More notable, however, is the result 
showing schools with higher proportions of Hispanic and African-American students relative to the 
proportion of White students, experienced increases in participation rates. Schools with larger 
proportions of African-American students showed positive and significant increases in participation 
during the opt-out time period. The effect was smallest in the third and fourth grades at 0.064% 
increase and highest in the ninth grade at 0.422% increase in participation. Schools with higher 
proportions of Hispanic students followed a similar patter with third grade showing the smallest 
increase at 0.046% and eighth grade showing the highest relative change at 0.178%.   
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Table 5 
Regression results for Race/Ethnicity 
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Native 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.025 0.038* 0.003 -0.059 
VIF 1.93 (-0.024) (0.013) (0.020) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.037) 
Asian -0.036** -0.042*** -0.035* 0.016 0.020 0.050* 0.290** 
VIF 2.06 (-0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.113) 
Hispanic 0.013*** 0.008* 0.003 0.018** 0.020** 0.024** 0.052*** 
VIF 4.12 (-0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
Black (0.013) 0.018** 0.0065 -0.011 0.020 0.034 0.058 
VIF 2.66 (-0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.035) (0.017) (0.022) (0.041) 
Multi (-0.007) -0.036** -0.008 -0.009 0.014 0.029 -0.046 
VIF 2.81 (-0.018) (0.016) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039) (0.056) (0.138) 
Opt Out -6.360*** -8.129*** -8.361*** 
-
10.92*** 
-
14.71*** 
-
17.67*** -21.81*** 
 (-0.744) (0.798) (0.812) (1.086) (1.525) (1.610) (2.405) 
Native* Opt Out -0.045 -0.048 -0.086 -0.330* -0.243 -0.271 -1.182** 
VIF 2.07 (-0.092) (0.0954) (0.122) (0.188) (0.250) (0.342) (0.545) 
Asian* Opt Out 0.138*** 0.128** 0.0966 0.0907 0.180* 0.0167 -0.653* 
VIF 2.61 (-0.045) (0.054) (0.062) (0.085) (0.106) (0.144) (0.340) 
Black* Opt Out 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.080*** 0.148*** 0.238*** 0.293*** 0.422*** 
VIF 2.47 (-0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.047) (0.040) (0.059) (0.099) 
Multi* Opt Out -0.059 0.0336 -0.0559 -0.0411 -0.382 -0.527* -1.684*** 
VIF 2.81 (-0.099) (0.105) (0.117) (0.176) (0.254) (0.275) (0.556) 
Hispanic* Opt 
Out 0.046*** 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.141*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 
 VIF 5.11 (-0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020 (0.034) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses Reference Group (White) 
 
 Table 6 shows interaction results for the relationship between SPF—the school’s 
accountability rating— and participation rates. Prior to opt-out lower ranked schools consistently 
had lower participation rates relative to the top ranked Performance category. During the opt-out 
period, those results reverse sign with lower ranked schools showing an increase in participation 
rates relative to top ranked schools. The difference by school performance ranking was most stark in 
the middle and high school grades. For instance, controlling for other factors, the participation rates 
of turnaround and improvement schools increased by 13.51% and 10.27% in the eighth and ninth 
grades respectively. These regression results square with basic descriptive statistics that do not 
include statistical adjustments. The participation rates on the eighth grade ELA exam in 2014 and 
2015, respectively, was 97% and 94% in turnaround schools, 99% and 91% in priority improvement 
schools, but 99% and 86% in performance schools. Note that there was a decline in participation in 
each of these school types at the time that opt-out began. This decline was just much larger in the 
higher rated schools than in the lower rated schools. 
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Table 6 
Regression results for School Performance Factor 
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Improvement -0.241* -0.644*** -0.535*** -0.904** -0.961*** -1.736*** -2.600*** 
VIF 2.03 (0.129) (0.119) (0.174) (0.429) (0.210) (0.290) (0.751) 
Priority -0.409*** -1.006*** -0.829*** -1.049*** -1.780*** -3.226*** -3.864*** 
VIF 1.88 (0.151) (0.191) (0.228) (0.343) (0.337) (0.654) (1.238) 
Turnaround -1.175** -1.373*** -2.553 -2.303*** -2.904*** -5.205*** -12.90*** 
VIF 1.96 (0.564) (0.300) (1.621) (0.424) (0.530) (1.024) (4.273) 
Opt Out -4.872*** -5.539*** -5.758*** -8.248*** -11.69*** -14.50*** -25.14*** 
 (0.256) (0.277) (0.300) (0.472) (0.645) (0.710) (1.162) 
Turnaround* 
Opt Out 0.154 1.624* 3.218* 2.536*** 5.414*** 9.029*** 13.51** 
VIF 1.90 (1.276) (0.858) (1.860) (0.974) (1.231) (1.250) (6.012) 
Priority* Opt 
Out 1.543*** 2.778*** 2.191*** 3.571*** 5.458*** 5.533*** 6.318 
VIF 1.78 (0.411) (0.348) (0.436) (0.658) (1.021) (1.791) (4.385) 
Improvement* 
Opt Out 0.876** 1.193** 0.804 2.246** 3.285*** 3.680*** 10.27*** 
VIF 2.09 (0.428) (0.507) (0.535) (0.903) (1.066) (1.255) (1.672) 
Observations 4,707 4,702 4,671 2,846 2,246 2,191 1,556 
R-squared 0.168 0.181 0.158 0.198 0.275 0.312 0.409 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses Reference  Group (Performance) 
 
Table 7 shows results for charter schools and those with higher rates of poverty as measured 
by participation in the Free/Reduced price lunches (FRL). During the opt-out period, increasing 
percentages of FRL students corresponded to significantly increased participation rates. The effect 
was smallest in the third grade at 0.021% increase and largest in the ninth grade at 0.178% increase. 
The main effect for charter schools was a consistent decrease in participation. During opt-out, 
charter elementary schools had larger drops in participation relative to traditional public schools 
with the most pronounced change in the third and fourth grades at -2.87% and -2.73% respectively. 
Curiously, this effect changes sign in later grades with charter schools showing an increase in 
participation relative to traditional public schools of 3.26% in the eighth grade.  
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Table 7 
Regression Results for Charter and Percentage Free/Reduced Lunch 
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Charter -0.472*** -0.502*** -1.428*** -1.215*** 
-
1.449*** 
-
1.261*** -1.817** 
VIF 1.9 (0.151) (0.116) (0.496) (0.322) (0.205) (0.265) (0.724) 
%FRL -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.080*** 
-
0.129*** 
-
0.152*** 
-
0.233*** 
VIF 4.46 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) 
Opt Out -5.074*** -6.376*** -7.241*** -10.03*** 
-
15.38*** 
-
19.80*** 
-
29.28*** 
 (0.272) (0.332) (0.368) (0.606) (0.870) (1.071) (1.581) 
Charter* Opt 
Out -2.870*** -2.733*** -1.620 -0.261 2.244** 3.260** 3.173 
VIF 1.96 (0.876) (0.967) (1.116) (0.987) (1.052) (1.276) (2.393) 
%FRL* Opt Out 0.021*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.070*** 0.114*** 0.155*** 0.178*** 
VIF 2.78 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.035) 
Observations 4,707 4,702 4,671 2,846 2,246 2,191 1,556 
R-squared 0.178 0.193 0.169 0.205 0.287 0.331 0.409 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Robustness Tests 
  
 Tables 3 through 6 present results for a specific source of motivation for opting-out—
urbanicity, race/ethnicity, SPF, charter, or Free/Reduced price lunches. They do not, however, 
present a fully interacted model, which we present in Table 8. The fully interacted model acts as 
robustness test of model specification. The limited interaction models in the previous tables do not 
include the full vector of school characteristics and their interaction in order to concentrate attention 
on individual sources of motivation for opt-out.  
 The results for the fully interacted model do reveal changes when including the full vector of 
covariates and their interactions. In most instances, interactions for the opt-out period lose their 
significance and reduce in magnitude. In some instances, the coefficients change direction as well. 
This reveals the model is not robust to model specifications and there may be other sources of 
variance that are not identified in this model. Further, a VIF test revealed an unacceptably high VIF 
for Free/reduced price lunch participation (r =0.60, VIF12.09) and the variable was removed from the 
final model. 
The fully interacted model in Table 8 presents a more complex picture as many of the 
interactions lose significance. There were some consistent results across model specifications. 
Notably, charter participation rates showed similar, significant declines in participation in the 
elementary grades across both the limited and fully interacted models. In the fully interacted model, 
charter status corresponded to 3.334% decline in participation in the third grade and remained 
significant—although smaller—through the sixth grade with a 1.714% decline. Similarly, increasing 
proportions of Black and Hispanic students continued to correspond with significant increases in 
participation across all grades. In the fully interacted model, increases in the proportion of Black 
students corresponded to a significant increase in participation all grades ranging from 0.064% in the 
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third grade to 0.422% in the ninth grade. Similarly, increases in the proportion of Hispanic students 
corresponded to significant increases in participation across all grades. In this case of Hispanic 
students the point estimates in Table 5 and Table 8 remained closer than for other races/ethnicities. 
Results for SPF were not as robust in the fully interacted model. In Table 5, the limited 
interaction model showed consistent and significant effects in grades six through nine for 
turnaround schools and all grades for priority improvement and improvement schools. In contrast, 
the fully interacted model in Table 8 shows inconsistent effects for SPF with the exception of 
Improvement schools in the ninth grade still showing a 6.86% increase in participation relative to 
the highest ranked reference group (performance). Similarly, urbanicity was no longer significant 
with the exception of suburban third graders in the fully interacted model at 1.426% increase in 
participation.  
 
Table 8 
Regression Results for Fully Interacted Model 
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th  9th 
                
Improvement -0.046 -0.200*** 0.139 -0.366 -0.116 -0.303** -1.185** 
 0.095 0.066 0.159 0.424 0.072 0.129 0.575 
Priority 0.017 -0.265** 0.222 -0.112 -0.187 -0.952 -1.584 
 0.089 0.116 0.186 0.274 0.143 0.592 1.206 
Turnaround -0.456 -0.263 -1.099 -0.596* -0.657 -2.128** -9.192* 
 0.531 0.230 1.598 0.358 0.400 1.032 4.782 
Native -0.010 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.014 -0.012 -0.002 
 0.020 0.009 0.022 0.019 0.010 0.024 0.033 
Asian -0.008 -0.018* -0.012 0.0415*** 0.034** 0.044** 0.242** 
 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.021 0.099 
Hispanic 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.006* 0.001 0.009** 0.008 
 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.009 
Black  -0.020** -0.001 -0.012 -0.031 -0.002 0.008 0.025 
 0.009 0.004 0.027 0.034 0.006 0.009 0.023 
Multi 0.011 -0.009 0.006 0.0439* 0.024 -0.007 -0.106 
 0.014 0.011 0.033 0.023 0.018 0.039 0.115 
Charter -0.051 -0.002 -0.915* -0.100 0.152** 0.409*** -0.802 
 0.136 0.101 0.492 0.353 0.069 0.113 0.516 
Opt Out 
-
6.134*** -7.045*** 
-
8.027*** -9.234*** 
-
14.90*** 
-
20.13*** 
-
24.95*** 
 0.983 1.066 1.269 1.682 2.389 2.667 4.383 
Rural  -0.003 0.058 -0.285 -0.006 0.001 0.078 -0.468 
 0.087 0.081 0.492 0.174 0.116 0.165 0.472 
Suburban -0.103 0.035 -0.141 -0.020 0.121 -0.117 0.112 
 0.090 0.068 0.375 0.139 0.114 0.170 0.547 
Charter* Opt Out 
-
3.334*** -3.302*** -2.303** -1.714* 0.551 1.359 3.425 
VIF=1.95 0.885 0.975 1.121 1.040 1.051 1.277 2.458 
Turnaround* Opt Out -1.341 -0.704 -0.129 -2.075* -0.555 0.263 2.447 
VIF=2.40 1.382 1.035 1.983 1.090 1.444 1.625 7.291 
Improvement* Opt Out -0.0872 -0.358 -1.327** 0.0387 0.560 -0.204 6.860*** 
VIF=2.44 0.519 0.606 0.633 1.031 1.110 1.300 2.049 
Priority* Opt Out -0.166 0.288 -1.133* 0.333 1.322 0.170 -0.643 
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Table 8 cont. 
Regression Results for Fully Interacted Model 
VIF=2.11 0.539 0.515 0.616 0.868 1.098 1.972 4.693 
Rural* Opt Out 0.0471 -0.592 -0.103 -1.339 0.242 2.063 3.458 
VIF=6.25 0.570 0.590 0.834 1.011 1.374 1.616 2.948 
Suburban* Opt Out 1.426*** 0.507 0.919 0.0988 0.120 0.832 -1.864 
VIF=5.88 0.507 0.524 0.686 0.924 1.227 1.448 2.705 
Native* Opt Out -0.0254 -0.0457 -0.0752 -0.320* -0.238 -0.263 -1.402** 
VIF=2.19 0.101 0.104 0.132 0.189 0.252 0.346 0.569 
Asian* Opt Out 0.0967** 0.0937* 0.0528 0.0464 0.170 0.0400 -0.456 
VIF=2.79 0.046 0.055 0.061 0.086 0.107 0.150 0.380 
Black* Opt Out 0.113*** 0.0864*** 0.111*** 0.165*** 0.249*** 0.329*** 0.441*** 
VIF=3.43 0.024 0.023 0.035 0.053 0.044 0.064 0.117 
Multi* Opt Out -0.100 -0.0322 -0.0921 -0.161 -0.382 -0.405 -1.428** 
VIF=7.27 0.106 0.111 0.130 0.189 0.283 0.301 0.611 
Hispanic* Opt Out 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.104*** 0.149*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 
VIF=6.77 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.023 0.026 0.044 
Observations 4,707 4,702 4,671 2,846 2,246 2,191 1,556 
R-squared 0.189 0.209 0.188 0.222 0.309 0.353 0.442 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 As a final test of robustness, we present Table 9 in which we computed a falsification test 
with all the same models using 2013 as the interaction year. Since 2013 is prior to opt-out we would 
not expect to see any of the same results. None of the individual 2013 interaction models for 
urbanicity, race/ethnicity, SPF, charter, or Free/Reduced price lunches were significant. For 
simplicity we present only the fully interacted model of the falsification test. In the fully interacted 
model, the only consistently significant result is for Hispanic students, who showed a decline in 
participation rates relative to the other baseline years.  
 
Table 9 
Regression Results for Falsification Test 
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
                
Improvement 0.082 -0.482 -0.386 -0.238 -0.228 -1.001 0.213 
 (0.315) (0.386) (0.401) (0.568) (0.672) (0.769) (1.185) 
Priority 0.006 -0.341 -0.304 -0.164 -0.507 -2.854** 
-
5.142** 
 (0.291) (0.283) (0.350) (0.465) (0.646) (1.417) (2.353) 
Turnaround -0.996 -0.653 -0.646 -1.602*** -1.787** -3.004** -6.315 
 (0.769) (0.544) (0.831) (0.585) (0.826) (1.202) (4.886) 
Native -0.029 -0.016 -0.088 -0.151 -0.124 -0.208 -0.422* 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.084) (0.139) (0.174) (0.237) (0.245) 
Asian 0.019 0.017 0.025 0.096** 0.120* 0.118 -0.010 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.036) (0.047) (0.062) (0.091) (0.223) 
Hispanic 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.033** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.0761*** 0.0562* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) 
Black 0.023 0.033** 0.0131 0.05* 0.101*** 0.098** 0.048 
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Table 9 cont. 
Regression Results for Falsification Test 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.045) (0.074) 
Multiracial -0.069 -0.022 -0.080 -0.050 -0.165 -0.189 -0.455 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.090) (0.109) (0.145) (0.164) (0.342) 
Charter -1.580*** -1.652*** -2.723*** -1.123** 0.482 0.951 2.449 
 (0.536) (0.584) (0.766) (0.531) (0.604) (0.804) (1.515) 
Rural -0.462 -0.212 -0.875 -0.564 0.615 1.372 1.365 
 (0.315) (0.315) (0.565) (0.477) (0.693) (0.879) (1.741) 
Suburban 0.163 0.243 -0.126 0.325 0.858 0.531 -0.233 
 (0.275) (0.269) (0.413) (0.430) (0.640) (0.779) (1.546) 
Free/Reduced -0.018** -0.013 -0.007 -0.026 -0.001 0.028 0.084** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.038) 
2013 -0.014** -0.494*** -0.748 -1.654* -1.461*** -1.349** -2.039* 
 (0.183) (0.180) (0.483) (0889) (0.398) (0.555) (1.039) 
Rural* 2013 0.598* 0.169 1.510* 0.465 -0.392 -1.086 -1.756 
 (0.345) (0.349) (0.901) (0.599) (0.729) (0.898) (1.922) 
Suburban* 2013 -0.222 -0.271 0.745 -0.640 -0.701 -0.893 -0.884 
 (0.304) (0.296) (0.764) (0.547) (0.657) (0.826) (1.714) 
Turnaround* 2013 0.889 0.005 -5.198 1.041 0.827 2.553* -0.051 
 (0.872) (0.891) (5.800) (1.170) (1.447) (1.460) (5.131) 
Improvement* 2013 -0.215 0.0960 0.235 -0.595 0.170 0.977 -1.333 
 (0.392) (0.408) (0.416) (1.380) (0.684) (0.782) (1.575) 
Priority* 2013 -0.082 0.110 0.305 0.235 -0.002 2.439* 3.838 
 (0.346) (0.335) (0.407) (0.775) (0.713) (1.419) (2.474) 
Native* 2013 -0.0303 0.0320 0.0956 0.170 0.142 0.160 0.402 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.085) (0.142) (0.176) (0.242) (0.253) 
Asian* 2013 -0.008 -0.047 -0.042 -0.078 -0.110* -0.094 0.116 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.062) (0.065) (0.100) (0.243) 
Black* 2013 -0.047** -0.032* 0.022 -0.148 -0.120*** -0.109** -0.073 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.055) (0.101) (0.035) (0.045) (0.079) 
Hispanic* 2013 -0.029** -0.039*** -0.047*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.077*** -0.068* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) 
Multiracial* 2013 0.121 0.00159 0.0869 0.0949 0.178 0.205 0.241 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.093) (0.116) (0.150) (0.167) (0.385) 
Charter* 2013 1.720*** 1.615*** 2.693*** 0.877 -0.163 -0.450 -2.456 
 (0.542) (0.580) (0.762) (1.105) (0.618) (0.829) (1.649) 
Free/Reduced *2013 0.019** 0.010 0.017 0.035 0.005 -0.022 -0.073* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.040) 
        
Observations 3,756 3,751 3,725 2,273 1,788 1,748 1,239 
R-squared 0.179 0.182 0.158 0.195 0.293 0.318 0.449 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Unfortunately, results are not fully robust to changes in model specification. There are, 
however, significant predictors of changes in participation rates that remain across specifications. 
Notably, charter schools in elementary grades corresponded with large decreases in participation. 
Increases in the proportion of Black and Hispanic students consistently showed relative increases in 
participation and was robust to changes in model specifications. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
  The opt-out movement has the potential to be one of the most important phenomena in 
education policy today. Test data is widely used by states, districts, and schools in order to find areas 
of excellence and weakness in public schools and can influence critical factors including school 
rankings, program evaluation, and merit pay. However, for these tests to be informative, they must 
present information representative of the students enrolled in the schools. The opt-out movement 
threatens the ability of tests to serve that task.  
Our results extend the literature beyond the previous examinations of New York (Bennett, 
2016; Chingos, 2015) through a systematic analysis of a state not previously published, Colorado. 
Further, ours is the first study, of which we are aware, that employs panel data instead of a cross-
sectional design. We illustrate the type of schools that have experienced changes in the proportion 
of students sitting for standardized exams. We find that opt-out is a widespread phenomenon within 
Colorado. However, the change in test participation was largest in suburban and rural areas, higher 
performing schools, schools with a higher proportion of White students, schools with lower 
proportions of students participating in Free/Reduced price lunches, and elementary students in 
charter schools. These results are at least consistent with the popular press narrative that opt-out is 
largely a response from parents whose children are likely to do well on the exams. For charter 
schools, it is not suprising that parents who were engaged in school choice were also more likely to 
make an affirmative decision not to take part in state required testing.   
One of the motivations behind the 95% participation requirement was to ensure the validity 
of inferences behind exam results. School level results do not appear to show systematic non-
participation in the types of schools most likely to benefit from by actively encouraging parents and 
students to opt-out — those lowest in SPF rankings. Instead, the results seem to support a narrative 
that opt-out is largely driven by high-achieving schools. This could be due to a perceived lack of 
benefit from school accountability mechanisms and/or a reaction to what is perceived to be onerous 
levels of testing (Gorski, 2015b; Pizmony-Levy & Saraisky, 2016; Robertson, 2015).  
These results can also be explained, at least partially, by theories of cultural capital – more 
specifically, by differences in cultural capital reflective of social class. As noted earlier, families with 
more cultural capital perceive and interact with schools differently (Lareau, 1987; Lareau & Horvat, 
1999). More affluent families express differing levels of expectations from schools and generally 
have higher levels of involvement, often irrespective of race (Lareau, 1987; Lareau & Horvat, 1999). 
Because of this increased involvement, parents may recognize that students’ participation in 
standardized testing is not mandatory. Indeed, such parents may view school accountability 
measures and testing requirements as something being done to other types of schools, not the 
schools where their children attend. These parents may feel empowered to use their privileged 
position to protest high stakes testing – they may have concerns about over-testing and increased 
privatization, or they may reject the concept of using tests to hold teachers and schools accountable. 
This aligns with the (limited) existing research. It is also reflected in the more than two thirds of opt-
out participants who gave their children’s schools an A or B rating and also indicated that their 
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primary reasons for opting-out was opposition to the use of tests to evaluate teachers (Pizmony-
Levy & Saraisky, 2016).  
 Parents with higher levels of cultural capital may also use their privilege to provide their 
students with advantages (Lareau & Calarco, 2012), which in this case could include helping their 
children avoid “testing fatigue” or over-testing. Highly-informed parents with higher levels of 
cultural capital may be more concerned about over-testing or the perceived lack of utility in testing 
and may take steps to focus their students’ energy on more important tests. For example, although 
participation rates for PARCC testing in high schools declined during this time, there was not a 
similar decline in participation in Advanced Placement (AP) tests. From 2014 to 2016 the number of 
participating schools in offering AP classes increased by 31% and the number of AP examinations 
administered increased by 9% (College Board, 2016). In the Pizmony-Levy and Saraisky survey 
(2016), 27% of respondents listed “standardized tests take away too much time” as a reason for 
opting-out (p. 22). However, this does not appear to apply to AP tests, suggesting that parents may 
see these tests as more useful and more beneficial to students than high stakes accountability testing 
since AP tests reflect college bound behaviors. As a result, parents with higher degrees of cultural 
capital may see value in AP, but they may opt-out their students from the “extraneous” state tests. 
Conversely, scholars have consistently shown that parents with less cultural capital may be 
less informed about educational processes more generally and are thus more likely to defer to 
teacher and school decisions and processes (Lareau, 1987; Lareau & Horvat, 1999). For example, 
parents with lower levels of cultural capital may be more likely to defer to school procedures even if 
they are aware they can withdraw their students from testing and may be less likely to know that 
opting-out is an option in the first place. In other words, these parents may feel that they do not 
know as much about education and/or what is educationally best for their children as the teachers 
and administrators at their children’s schools and may thus refrain from opting-out. Alternatively, 
perhaps due to less involvement in the day-to-day processes of the school, these parents may not 
even know that opting-out is an option (something schools are unlikely to widely advertise, given the 
high stakes nature of testing). Thus, parents who opt-out must have outside knowledge of schooling 
and testing processes. Pizmony-Levy and Saraisky (2016) frame the opt-out movement in similar 
terms identifying it as social movement with necessary conditions of resources, changes in political 
structures, and communication of demands to achieve success. Two of the key elements they 
identify are “opposition to the Common Core” and opposition to the “the growing role of 
corporations in schools” (p. 22), both of which require higher levels of knowledge about school 
processes and schooling in general.  
 The results of this paper are highly relevant for the policy conversation and for the general 
understanding of the nature and potential impacts of the opt-out movement, at least as it has been 
applied so far. Given that the idea of high stakes testing is reliant on those tests being representative 
of each school’s student population, higher levels of opt-out from any group is cause for concern. 
Colorado is one of a few states to have experienced a large and sustained decrease in test 
participation starting in 2015 (Bennett, 2016). There is little reason to believe this movement would 
not spread to other states. Indeed, in 2016, the U.S. Department of Education warned 11 states 
about their falling participation rates (Pizmony-Levy, 2018). This study presents Colorado as an 
informative case study as well as a quantitative perspective to the growing body of research into the 
opt-out phenomenon. A single state failing to meet federal accountability requirements presents an 
interesting test for decentralization efforts of the Department of Education under the current 
administration.  
From the perspective of those who want to continue to use testing and accountability as a 
way to hold ineffective schools responsible for poor performance, our finding that opt-out is much 
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larger in schools that had previously received high performance ratings is somewhat comforting. 
However, the fact that participation rates do decline in lower performing schools, just not as much 
as in high-performing schools, suggests the possibility of broader policy implications. The examples 
of teachers and principals in lower performing schools responding to pressures of accountability are 
numerous (Blinder, 2015; Jacob & Levitt, 2002) and relaxing participation requirements may invite 
schools facing sanctions to encourage strategic opting-out. 
 Our work utilizes school-level data, which captures many of the important school and 
community effects. It may, however, mask many important characteristics associated with opting-
out such as prior student achievement and the relationship between demographic characteristics on 
the student level. Further research using student-level data is needed in order to assess which 
students within schools are more likely to opt-out. Such an analysis would be in a better position to 
understand whether there is any strategic opt-out according to prior student performance. 
Alternatively, a finding more consistent with the results in this paper may support the conclusion 
that opt-out is more likely among higher performing students that see the test as an unnecessary 
burden.   
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